Beauty, being, and the transcendentals

[This post is a little heavier than usual. A summary of the argument and more interesting implications can be found at the end of the post!]

Most people today understand beauty to be a subjective appraisal of an object. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so goes the saying. This idiom is often resorted to when people disagree about whether or not something is beautiful. Imagine you and I are at an art gallery. You find a particular work beautiful, but I don't. We talk for a bit, and end up agreeing to disagree. And no hard feelings, we tell each other, because beauty is in the eye of the beholder. You're not wrong and I'm not wrong. We just have a different opinion. Beauty, this perspective proposes, is a matter of taste. Or is it? We're asking this question: Is there any on which can we judge something as more beautiful than another thing?

Before we answer that question, let's remember why we're asking it. What's at stake in the question? Why should we care if beauty has an objective basis or whether it's just a matter of taste? it gets back to the teachings of Mother Teresa that we're trying to understand. "Make every action something beautiful for God," she instructs us. Well, if beauty is simply a matter of taste, than what makes an action beautiful or not beautiful is just a matter of taste, a matter of opinion. And once we accept that premise, we very quickly fall into moral relativism (the refutation of which would require another post, at least).

Not so uncommon a view today.

But back to the question: is beauty merely a matter of opinion? I think that the reduction of beauty to subjective judgment without an objective basis degrades beauty to the level of all other things that are a matter of taste. You might like vanilla ice cream and I might like chocolate ice cream, but we can disagree--it's a matter of taste. Vanilla is not objectively better than chocolate. We just have different preferences. Is the same true of art? Is a pop song by Ke$ha really just as beautiful as Beethoven's Ninth Symphony (hint: the answer is no)? And if Beethoven's symphony is more beautiful, what is the objective basis for making such a determination?

Before we can answer that question, we need a small crash course in Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics in order to familiarize ourselves with two concepts: being and the transcendentals. I'll be drawing mostly from the thought of Thomas Aquinas. We proceed to our first question:

What is being? Ens est id cuius actus est esse [see this wonderful compilation of scholastic axioms]. Being is that whose act is to be. We could say that anything that is has being. But we should note that being is different than existence. Existence is dichotomous. A tree exists and a man exist. But a man exists in a different way than a tree. His act of being is different than the tree's. In scholastic terminology, we say that the particular mode of being of the man--i.e., the form of the man--is different than the form of the tree. A man exists as a creature that thinks, wills, feels, etc. A tree does none of these things, but it does grow and reproduce.

Here's my point: whereas existence is dichotomous (things either exist or they don't), being is intensive (things can exist in many different ways, on account of their different forms). To put it another way, being admits of degrees. We could say it's multichotomous, rather than dichotomous. A man has more being than a tree, because it can think and will and feel and move, whereas a tree can only grow and reproduce. Man more fully expresses the possibilities of being.

Hierarchy of Being.
From Rhetorica Christiana, 1579. 

Why should we care about the difference between being and existence, whether one is dichotomous and the other is intensive, etc? Keep reading. We need one more concept to get there, the transcendentals. What are the transcendentals? Transcendentale est universalis modu entis inquantum entis. A transcendental is a universal mode of being insofar as it is being. To put it another way: a transcendental is a property of being that pertains to all being qua being. All things that are possess these properties. 

In Scholastic philosophy, they are four: all being is one, true, good, and beautiful. Since all being as being has these properties, the transcendentals are convertible. So whatever is one is also true, good, and beautiful; whatever is beautiful is also one, true, and good; etc. Under this schema, what is beauty? Ens relate ad apprehensum. Being in relation to the apprehension. It is the revelatory character of being, the aspect of being that is self-showing, that gives itself to the intellect to be understood (as truth) and acted upon by the will (as good). As Balthasar would have it: "The basic phenomenon in all three of them [the true, good, and beautiful] was their epiphanic character, which permeates everything that exists: self-showing (beauty), self-giving (goodness), self-saying (truth), were all seen to be various aspects of this appearing. This appearing is a king of shining-out that recalls the illuminating action of light" (Chapter 5, section c in the Epilogue to his Triptych).

Of course, none of these are my ideas, nor are they new ideas. I'm relying here first of all on Plato's notion of beauty from Symposium: beauty is the epiphany of form that functions as a bridge to the divine (cf. 210 [acc. to Stephanus pagination]). I am also appropriating Heidegger's notion of aletheia (unconcealedness or disclosure), which he identifies as truth in The Origin of the Work of Art but later admits, correctly I think, that "to raise the question of aletheia, of disclosure as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call aletheia, in the sense of opening, truth" (On Time and Being, p. 70). I think what Heidegger was getting at with the notion of aletheia as the opening and disclosure of a world is what Plato understood as the epiphany of form and what the Scholastics would understand as beauty. So the notion of beauty as the self-showing aspect of being has a long and rather distinguished philosophical genealogy.

Plato's Academy. Mosaic from a villa in Pompeii.

At this point, perhaps you're thinking that not all things are beautiful and true and good. There seems to be much in the world that is not beautiful and good. Things like genocide, starving children, civil wars, and natural disasters that we read about in the news every day. Here it is important to keep in mind the aspect under which being is beautiful, etc. All being is beautiful as being. Some beings as evil agents are perverse and ugly. But even these people who do ugly things are still beautiful insofar as they are beings. They are morally evil, yes, but ontologically good, true, and beautiful. So we need to be careful to recognize the formal aspects under which we judge something as beautiful. 

To summarize: 

1. Being is that which is. Everything that exists has being, but not all being exists in the same way. Different beings exist through different modes (called forms). Being admits of degrees in such a way that one thing (e.g., a man) can have more being than another thing (e.g., a tree). 
2. The transcendentals are properties common to all being as being. That is to say: everything that is has these qualities. They are the one, true, good, and beautiful. Beauty is being qua being as it relates to the apprehension. It is, in other words, the self-showing property of being. 

With this framework, our conclusions about beauty fall into place rather easily:

1. All things that exist are beings. Some things have more being than others (they more fully express the possible ways of being).
2. All being possess transcendental properties. The more being a thing possesses, the more one, true, good, and beautiful it is qua being. Why? If beauty is the self-showing property of being, a thing that has more being will be able to show/reveal more being than that which has less. 

To answer our original question: we can judge something as more or less beautiful on the basis that it possesses and shows forth more being than another. This is primarily a conclusion that applies to the ontological realm. It would take quite a bit more work to move from here to the ethical realm, but I would at least suggest a way forward: the human who lives a more beautiful life is the one who more fully reveals the possibilities of being and the nature of being itself.

If God is the source of all being-- ipsum esse per se subsistens, being itself subsisting through itself (again, material another post!)--then the human who is most beautiful is the one whose life more fully reveals being itself by conforming itself to that Being's mode of being. And if the essence of that supreme being--being itself--is love, then the life that is most beautiful is the life most fully lived in love. And what is it to love? To will the good of the other as other (that is, for its own good and not for your own benefit). So Christ lived the most beautiful human life because through his human nature he most fully revealed (incarnated) being itself is and showed forth the possibilities of being. He most fully showed us what love is and how to love.

I would suggest that the saints and blesseds, including Mother Teresa, did something similar: showing us new ways of living in the world in conformance with the life of freedom that is life lived in and for God.